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Article 2

THE NATURAL LAW AND THE "PURSUIT OF
HAPPINESS"*
There is no exception to the proposition that happiness is
what everyone desires and seeks. "To desire happiness,"
says St. Thomas, "is nothing else than to desire that the will
be satisfied, and this every man desires." ' Happiness indeed "is an act in discharge of the function proper to man, as
man. There is a function proper to the eye, to the ear, to
the various organs of the human body; there must be a
function proper to man as such." 2 And so the desire for
happiness is not something accidental or acquired by experience. It is as natural as the desire for food or the desire for
social communication through speech. It is part of man's
original endowment, and is fundamental to his nature. The
pursuit of happiness, therefore, whether conscious and explicit or not, is the universal occupation and preoccupation
of mankind.
From time immemorial there have been countless theories
as to the nature of happiness-the ultimate good of man.
St. Augustine, with the help of Marcus Varro's book De
Philosophia was able to compile two hundred and eightyeight opinions of the philosophers as to the nature of happiness. None of the two hundred and eighty-eight satisfied
Augustine. It is not likely, then, that in the present article
any theory of happiness will be discovered which has been
unheard of before. This field has been well ploughed and
thoroughly cultivated throughout the ages, while the concept remains as enigmatic as it is familiar.
Nor is it my purpose to discover new theories or propose
novel considerations. I merely intend to explain somewhat,
*This article was delivered as an address at the Fourth Annual Natural Law
Institute of the College of Law of the University of Notre Dame on December 9, 1950. [Editor's note.]
1 ST. THomAs, SUMA TI.oGICA, I. 11, quaest. 5, art. 8. And cf., ST.
THoMAs, SummA CoNTRA GENTILS, I,
2

1.

RicxABY, MoRAL PnmosoPny 7 (3d ed. 1892).
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(to the extent possible in a brief paper) the concept "pursuit
of happiness" as it occurs in the American Declaration of
Independence. To do this it is first necessary to view briefly
some of the principal theories of happiness that the great
philosophers of the past have bequeathed to us, so that we
can place the philosophy of the Declaration in its proper
setting.
I.
Theories of Happiness
Early in Greek thought the concept of happiness became
identified with "the good" of man. Plato, refining the theories of Socrates, taught that the good or "well-doing"
(eupraxia) depended on such harmony between the various
faculties of man that a proper subordination of lower to
higher, of non-rational to rational elements was preserved.
To the earlier Greeks happiness was the reward of goodness
of life. To Plato it was rather the flowering of that harmonious functioning. Happiness belonged to the whole man and
not to any particular faculty of man, when his being was
functioning as it should by "following nature." Happiness
was not a passive state, therefore, but consisted in harmonious activity.
But when various schools of philosophy came to define
in the concrete what "following nature" meant, the Epicureans took one path and the Stoics another. To the Epicureans, following nature meant satisfying the senses with
pleasure, for the desires of the senses were the voices of
nature. To the Stoics, following nature meant satisfying
reason, which bids man to suppress, as they thought, all his
sensuous appetites. Thus while verbally in agreement with
Plato's principle of following nature, these two schools arrived at exactly opposite opinions as to what constituted in the
concrete the good of man, and consequently his happiness.
Aristotle agreed with Plato that nature means human nature as a whole, which is both sensuous and rational. Hence
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the good of man must satisfy both sensuous and rational appetites. But the highest good of man is happiness, because
that is what all men always and unrelentingly seek. Therefore this happiness or highest good must be the real purpose
of a man's life.
But in what does this happiness consist? This is answered
by a penetrating analysis by a leading scholar: I
Not in mere passive enjoyment, for this is open to the
brute, but in action, (energeia) of the kind that is proper to
man in contrast with other animals. This is intellectual action.
Not all kinds of intellectual action, however, results in happiness, but only virtuous action, that is, action which springs
from virtue and is according to its laws; for this alone is
appropriate to the nature of man. The highest happiness
corresponds to the highest virtue; it is the best activity of
the highest faculty.
Though happiness does not consist in pleasure, it does not
exclude pleasure. On the contrary, the highest form of
pleasure is the outcome of virtuous action. But for such
happiness to be complete it should be continued during a life
of average length in at least moderately comfortable circumstances, and enriched by intercourse with friends....
Virtues are either ethical or dianoetic (intellectual). The
latter pertain either to the practical or to the speculative
reason. This last is the highest faculty of all; hence the highest virtue is a habit of the speculative reason. Consequently
for Aristotle the highest happiness is to be found not in the
ethical virtues of the active life, but in the contemplative or
philosophic life of speculation in which the dianoetic virtues
of understanding, science, and wisdom are exercised.
Theoria, or pure speculation, is the highest activity of man,
and that by which he is most like unto the gods; for in this,
too, the happiness of the gods consists. It is in a sense
a Divine life. Only the few, however, can attain to it; the
great majority must be content with the inferior happiness
of the active life.
Happiness (eudaimonia), therefore, with Aristotle, is not
identical with pleasure (hedone), or even with the sum of
pleasures. It has been described as the kind of well-being
that consists in well-doing; and supreme happiness is thus
3

Maher, Happiness in 7 CATH. ENCYC. 131-2 (1913).
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the well-doing of the best faculty. Pleasure is a concomitant
or efflorescence of such an activity. [Paragraphs supplied.]

Therefore, the following seems to be a correct definition of
Aristotle's idea of happiness: "Happiness is a bringing of
the soul to act according to the habit of the best and most
perfect virtue, that is, the virtue of the speculative intellect,
borne out by easy surroundings, and enduring to length of
days." 4

I think the modern reader is apt to be somewhat repelled by the cold and metaphysical approach to happiness
that characterizes Aristotelian thought. He does mention
length of days, reasonable comfort and the society of friends.
But one wonders to what extent his choice of pure speculation as the happiest human activity was due to his occupational prejudice as a philosopher. One also wonders
whether he was really happy while he speculated on happiness. Along with his forerunners in Greek thought, Aristotle's happiness was a happiness of this life and of this
world. Nor does he identify the object that can satisfy the
infinite capacity of that speculative faculty.
It is not surprising then that when Christian thinkers
turned their minds to the philosophy of happiness they expanded the theories of Plato and Aristotle by invoking their
belief in a future life to be spent in the eternal enjoyment
of the one Infinite God who can satisfy man's utmost yearnings. Of these thinkers St. Augustine more than any other
influenced the course of future Christian thought. He propounded his views first in a brief dialogue, De Beata Vita
(On the Happy Life), written at the time of his conversion,
later in his tremendous treatise De Civitate Dei (On the
City of God), and finally in his renowned Confessions. His
approach to the subject is more psychological than metaphysical, and though he writes of the City of God his mind
is, paradoxically, down to earth.
4

RICKABY,

op. cit. supra note 2, at 12.
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After disposing of the two hundred and eighty-eight abovementioned opinions he comes to the point immediately: 5
If, then, we be asked what the city of God has to say
upon these points, and, in the first place, what its opinion

regarding the supreme good and evil is, it will reply that life
eternal is the supreme good, death eternal the supreme evil,
and that to obtain the one and escape the other we must live
rightly.... As for those who have supposed that the sovereign good and evil are to be found in this life, and have
placed it either in the soul or the body, or in both, or, to
speak more explicitly, either in pleasure or in virtue, or in
both, . . . -all these have, with a marvelous shallowness,
sought to find their blessedness [happiness] in this life and
in themselves. [Emphasis supplied.]

To those who seek their happiness in evil pleasures he says:
"You are seeking the happy life in the region of death; it
is not there. How can there be happy life, where there is
not even life?" 6 In this life happiness consists in hope:

"As, therefore, we are saved, so we are made happy by
hope." I When Augustine insists that true happiness is in
the knowledge of the One Truth and in the enjoyment of it,
he is reminiscent of Aristotle's activity of the speculative
reason. "... this [is] the happy life: to recognize piously
and completely the One through whom you are led into the
truth, the manner in which you enjoy the truth, and the
bond that connects you with the supreme measure." ' 8
"Happiness is nothing else but joy in the truth. .. . The
truth is so loved that whoever love something else want
what they love to be the truth. .. . He therefore will be
happy . . . who rejoices in the only truth, the truth itself
through which all things are true." ' "How therefore do I
seek Thee, 0 God? Because when I seek Thee, my God,
5

ST. AUGUSTmNE, DE CiVATE D x 19.4.1, as translated in 2 DoDs, TzE

Cirv or GoD 301-2 (1871).

6 ST. ATGUSTIw., CONrESSIONUM 4.12 (Wangnereck ed. 1930). [Translated
by the author.]
7 ST. AuGUSTrNE, DE CrIVTATE Dpi 19.4.5, as translated in 2 Dons, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 307.
8 ST. AUGUsTmqE, DE BEATA VrrA 4.35, as translated in ScHop?, THE HAP'PY
Lim 13 (1939).

9

ST. AUGUSTINE, op. cit. supra note 6, 10.23. [Translated by the author.]
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I am seeking the happy life." 10 All of Augustine's psychology, philosophy and theology of happiness is summed up
in the famous phrase from the first page of his Confessions:
"Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless
until it rests in Thee." 11
About one hundred years after the death of St. Augustine, Boethius wrote his famous The Consolation of Philosophy. This work, written in prison, had exceedingly
great influence on medieval and subsequent Christian
thought. Its author was a Christian scholar well versed in
the works of Plato and Aristotle and acquainted, too, with
the thought of Augustine. Boethius had occupied important
public offices but fell into disfavor, lost his wealth, was
imprisoned, and finally executed. He was well able to testify from sad experience to the truth of Augustine's dictum:
".. . lettered leisure, or public business, or the alternation
of these, do not necessarily constitute happiness." 12 Although some have cast doubt on his sanctity and even on
his Christianity, Boethius was honored in the middle ages
as a martyr and even today is revered in Pavia under the
title St. Severinus Boethius, Martyr.
His discourse on happiness is in the style of a classical
dialogue between himself and the lady Philosophy who
comes to console him in prison. His thought reflects the
ancient philosophers and neo-Platonists, and to a lesser extent Christian teachings. When Philosophy instructs him
that the aim of all men, without exception, whether they
know it or not, is the Good, Happiness, God, and that the
righteous attain this their aim and end, while the wicked
fail to reach it, we see the influence of Augustine as well
as of Plato.1" For Boethius "true happiness . . . is not to
10
11
12
supra
13

Id., 10.20. [Translated by the author.]

Id., 1.1. [Translated by the author.]
ST. AuGusTmI,
Da CrVATE DFz 19.2.1, as translated in 2 DoDs, op. cit.
note 5, at 297.
B~Azrr, BoFa'ius, Soa.E AsPEcTs or His TiMEs AND WORK 94 (1940).
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be found among any of the perishable things men so eagerly
pursue." 14 He says:"
The forms of good are the same thing as happiness, and
happiness is the Highest Good which is God....
Perfect good [happiness] exists when all the kinds of
good . . . are gathered together into a single kind of good;
then there will be no form of good lacking; all the forms

of good will form a unity and this unity shall be eternal.

Among other celebrated definitions of Boethius (another
example being his definition of eternity), which were commonplaces of medieval scholasticism, is his definition of
happiness: Beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus (Happiness is a state perfected by the
accumulation of all good). Boethius' teaching is especially
apropos in a paper on natural law and happiness, because
his Consolation is a conscious attempt to determine what
happiness is in the light of reason, unaided by the data of
revelation.
There is no doubt whatever that when the Scholastics
of the classical age, culminating in St. Thomas, adopted and
adapted the ethical system of Aristotle their thought was
mightily influenced by Augustine's City of God and Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy. But since the doctrine of
St. Thomas on happiness remains essentially unchanged today in the teaching of scholasticism .and in the teaching of
the Catholic Church, I will pass it by temporarily, in order
to discuss briefly a few of those philosophers who wrote
after the time of Descartes, and who were outside the scholastic tradition.
John Locke's teaching is especially important because his
works were in the hands of the founding fathers, and his
political philosophy was very influential in shaping American revolutionary thought. He discusses happiness and the
14 Id., at 90.
15 Borrmus, DE CONSOLATIONE PE roEAS, 3.34, as translated in SEDaFr- ., KING AL-RED'S VERSION OF THE CoNsoLATIoNs oF BoETrUs 98, 101 (1900).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

pursuit of happiness, however, when dealing with free will
rather than in a political context. According to Locke, also,
happiness is that "which we all aim at in all our actions." 16
Desire is the well-spring of all human action. And he declares: ",
If it be . .. asked, what it is moves desire? I answer,
happiness, and that alone. Happiness and misery are the
names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know
not.... But of some degree of both we have very lively .impressions . . .which for shortness' sake I shall comprehend
under the names of pleasure and pain, there being pleasure
and pain of the mind as well as of the body... or, to speak
truly, they are all of the mind; though some have their rise
in the mind from thought, others in the body from certain
modifications of motion.
Happiness, then, in its full extent, is the utmost pleasure
we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain; and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness is so much ease
from all pain, and so much present pleasure, as without which
any one cannot be content.

He then goes on to explain how the good is that which
causes happiness, and the evil that which causes pain, and
yet not every good moves man's desire, because not every
good, however great, is apprehended as a necessary part
of his happiness. "Happiness, under this view, every one
constantly pursues, and desires what makes any part of
it .. .. 18
Locke's theory of happiness was closely connected with
his idea of a morality based upon the will of God. The ultimate criterion of God's will, and consequently of moral
good, is "public happiness" in its highest degree, for God
has ". . . by an inseparable connexion joined virtue and
public happiness together. . . . " " Hence, says Fowler of
Locke, "we have only to ascertain, by the use of the natural
16 LocKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HuxAN" UNDERSTANDING 2.21.36,
PHmosoPmcA WORKS 380 (St. John ed. 1901),
17 Id., 2.21.41-2, 2 PHxnOSOPHICAL WORKS at 384.
18 Id., 2.21.43, 2 PIrOSopnicAL WORKS at 385.
19 Id., 1.3.6, 2 PxOsopnxcA WoRas at 160.

in 2
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reason, what on the whole conduces most to the public
welfare, in order to know the Divine Will." 20 This ethical
theory, then, is a theistic form of utilitarianism based on a
theological regard for the will of God. Its influence on subsequent writers has not always been sufficiently recognized. 2
We shall later see that it appears in the thinking of some
of the founding fathers.
Among the writers influenced by Locke was William
Paley, Archdeacon of Carlisle (1743-1805) who was a contemporary of the revolutionary statesmen and who published his Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy in
1785.22 That work contains a much-quoted chapter on
happiness wherein the learned divine strangely enough restricts himself almost entirely to a shrewd consideration of
the meaning of happiness in this life, though he admits in
passing that "A man who is in earnest in his endeavours
after the happiness of a future state, has, in this respect,
an advantage over all the world: for he has constantly before his eyes an object of supreme importance .... 23 His
theory of human happiness on earth is reduced to this:
happiness consists in a preponderance of pleasure over pain. 4
The word happy is a relative term....
In strictness, any condition may be denominated happy, in
which the amount or aggregate of pleasure exceeds that of
pain; and the degree of happiness depends upon the quantity of this excess....

I hold that pleasures differ in nothing, but in continuence
and intensity: from a just computation of which, confirmed
20 FowLEx,
JoxsN Loc=x 153 (1880).
ments; he is paraphrasing Locke.
21

These are not Fowler's own senti-

Ibid. "This form of Utilitarianism, resting on a theological basis, and

enforced by theological sanctions, is precisely that which afterwards became so

popular and excited so much attention, when adopted in the well-known work
of Paley.... I shall not here criticize Locke's theory so far as it is common to
other utilitarian systems of ethics, but shall simply content myself with pointing
out that its influence on subsequent writers has seldom, if ever, been sufficiently
recognized."
22 P.AY,The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy in 1 THE WopRs
or Wjnimr PALEY (Wayland ed. 1837).
23 Id., 1.6.23.
24 Id., 1.6.14-5.
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by what we observe of the apparent cheerfulness, tranquillity,
and contentment of men of different tastes, tempers, stations,
and pursuits, every question concerning human happiness
must receive its decision.

Despite these pronouncements, Paley's further exposition
shows that he is not a pure hedonist, but rather a theistic
utilitarian. For he makes the conduciveness of human acts
to temporal happiness, the criterion of their morality; but
he recognizes that it is the will of God which has ordained
that those acts which in the long run make mankind happy
are also morally good.
It is not my purpose here to trace the further development of the concept of happiness in English and Continental philosophers. The theories range from the altruistic stoicism of German rationaists who followed in the
footsteps of Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) to the hedonism
and "hedonistic calculus" of Jeremy B'entham (1748-1833),
the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), and the
evolutionary system of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Their
common denominator, if any, lies in the divorce of philosophy from theology, and a consequent preoccupation with
the psychological constituents of happiness in this life,
whether it be the happiness of the individual or the "greatest happiness of the greatest number."
The philosophy of happiness with the most ancient lineage
is the philosophia perennis of scholasticism. The teaching
of St. Thomas, derived from Aristotle and Plato through
Augustine and the Fathers of the Church, remains essentially unchanged today in the teaching of the neo-scholastics and of the Catholic Church. The following is a brief
summary of that teaching: 25
Man is complex in his nature and activities, sentient and
rational, cognitive and appetitive. There is for him a wellbeing of the whole and a well-being of the parts; a relatively
brief existence here, an everlasting life hereafter. Beatitudo,
perfect happiness, complete well-being, is to be attained not
25

Maher, supra note 3, at 133.

PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS
in this life, but in the next. Primarily, it consists in the
activity of man's highest cognitive faculty, the intellect, in
the contemplation of God-the infinitely Beautiful. But this
immediately results in the supreme delight of the will in the
conscious possession of the Summum Bonum, God, the infinitely good. This blissful activity of the highest spiritual
faculties, as the Catholic Faith teaches, will redound in some
manner transcending our present experience to the felicity
of the lower powers. For man, as man, will enjoy that perfect beatitude. Further, an integral part of that happiness
will be the consciousness that it is absolutely secure and
everlasting, an existence perfect in the tranquil and assured
possession of all good-Status omnium bonorum aggregatione
perfectus, as Boethius defines it. This state involves selfrealization of the highest order and perfection of the human
being in the highest degree. It combines whatever elements
of truth are contained in the Hedonist and Rationalist theories. It recognizes the possibility of a relative and incomplete happiness in this life, and its value; but it insists on
the importance of self-restraint, detachment, and control of
the particular faculties and appetencies for the attainment of
this limited happiness and, still more, in order to secure that
eternal well-being be not sacrificed for the sake of some
transitory enjoyment.

II.
Philosophical Origins of "The Pursuit of Happiness"
The never-dying words of the Declaration of Independence cannot be quoted too often, and for our purpose it
is necessary to quote some of them again:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.-That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed,--That whenever
any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends,
it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and
to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such
principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
[Emphasis supplied.]
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When Jefferson sat down to write this declaration he did
not have to consult books to find his principles. They were
part of his thinking as they were part of the political and
philosophical thinking of the times. He tells us himself:
"I know only that I turned to neither book nor pamphlet
while writing it." 26 And again he tells us that his purpose
was:

27

...
not to find out new principles, or new arguments, never
before thought of, not merely to say things that had never
been said before; but to place before mankind the common
sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their assent .... Neither aiming at originality of principles or sentiments, nor yet copied from any particular and

previous writing, it was intended to be an expression of the
American mind.... All its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or the elementary books
of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc.

It has been sometimes the fashion to belittle the fundamental philosophical principles of the founding fathers, and
to consider this "common sense of the subject" to be in the
nature of a series of glittering generalities, with 'little or no
definite content. But the natural law, like philosophy, "always buries its undertakers." 28 Previous convocations of
this Institute as well as the other papers contributed to the
present sessions are ample evidence that natural law, which
is that portion of the eternal law of God made known to
man by the light of natural reason, is not yet dead nor ever
will be. I consider the natural 'law philosophy which was
in the very air breathed in England and America in the
eighteenth century to be substantially the natural law philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and that which scholasticism
continues to teach today.29 Our task at present, however,
28

As quoted in BECKER, THE DEcLARATIoN OF INDEPENDENCE 25 (1b22).

27
28

Ibid.

GirSON, THE UNr= or PnLosopHcAL EXPERENCE 306 (1937).
I am not speaking here of French naturalism or of Rousseau's natural
man. The substantial agreement to which I refer includes the following points:
an infinite personal Creator, the source of man's inalienable rights and of moral
29
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is to examine the phrase "pursuit of happiness" and determine what its meaning and origin are in the Declaration.
In enumerating fundamental natural rights, many followers of Locke, including Samuel Adams, had been content
with the classical enumeration "life, liberty and property."
Some modern writers with a predilection for so-called human rights over property rights, and with a prejudice, perhaps, against private ownership, have thought to see in
Jefferson's substitution of "pursuit of happiness" for "property" a great innovation. V. L. Parrington writes: 0
... in Jefferson's hands the English doctrine was given a revolutionary shift. The substitution of 'pursuit of happiness'
for 'property' marks a complete break with the Whiggish
doctrine of property rights that Locke had bequeathed to the
English middle class, and the substitution of a broader sociological conception....

But is it not very unlikely that Jefferson would disagree
with the Constitution of Virginia which at the very time of
the Declaration of Independence was being drafted by
George Mason with the assistance of James Madison? That
document enumerates as inherent natural rights "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness
and safety." "' Nor is there any reason at all for believing
that Jefferson did not consider the right of acquiring property
as one of the fundamental and unalienable rights for which
governments existed to protect. It is much more likely that
Jefferson chose the more general term "'pursuit of happiness" simply because it was more general and inclusive, and
because it echoed an ethical and political view of happiness
obligation; principles of law and justice which transcend all human positive
laws, and which have their basis in God; human nature as the measure in some
sense of the immutable principles of morality.
30 PARPINGTON, MAin CuRm s IN A E icAN THOUGHT, as quoted in Bovn,
THE DECLARAT ON OF INDEPENDENcE 3-4 (1945).
31 VA. CoNsT. § 1 (1776). This language has been retained in all subsequent
Virginia Constitutions, and is now found in VA. CoNST. Art. I, § 1.
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current in the philosophy of the times." For there is no
doubt that the right to pursue happiness includes the right
to acquire property as well as the right to life and liberty;
and there can be no doubt, either, that among the then current theories both of ethics and of political science was the
idea that happiness is a criterion of morality, and general
happiness the ultimate criterion of good government.
The eighteenth century was a period during which nature
and the power of natural reason were glorified. In England-and consequently in America-although the prevailing tone was religious, and God's revelations in Scripture
were still accepted with profound respect, many thinkers
(among them Jefferson, I believe) seemed to have lost that: 3
. . .sense of intimate intercourse and familiar conversation
with God which religious men of the sixteenth and seventeenth century enjoyed. Since the later seventeenth century,
God had been withdrawing from immediate contact with men,
and had become, in proportion as he receded into the dim
32

Cf.

HARvEY, JEAN JACQUES

BURLAmAQUI:

A LiBERAL TRADiTIoN

In

A
wCAN
CONSTITUTIONALISm 123-4 (1937).
"Burlamaqui as one source for
the phrase, 'pursuit of happiness,' and its underlying philosophy rests upon a
number of factors. Jefferson owned a copy of Natural and Politic Law. It is
conceded that George Wythe, with whom Jefferson studied law, was familiar
with the work. In all probability Dr. Small, one of Jefferson's mentors, was
acquainted with it. In reading and copying Wilson's pamphlet he imbibed
freely the doctrine of Burlamaqui. Moreover, the concept was a rather common
one in the thought of the period. The similarity of the concept with that of
Burlamaqui is unmistakable. This has been noted by Fisher in his study of this
period. Professor Corwin declares a striking likeness. However, 'he is of the
opinion that the immediate source of the phrase was Blackstone. If this should
have been the case, it came originally from Burlamaqui. In the early portion
of the Commentaries Blackstone copied liberally from Natural and Politic Law.
Sir Henry Maine has charged that Blackstone copied 'textually' from Buriamaqui. Again, granting that Jefferson took the idea from Wilson's Considerations, it must be remembered that Wilson copied and cited Burlamaqui as an
authority for the concept. Upon the evidence at hand it is submitted that the
original of the phrase 'pursuit of happiness' is Natural and Politic Law." See
also id., at 96, 112, 120 for apposite citations from Burlamaqui. Cf. also BoYD,
op. cit. supra note 30, at 5 n.10, where it is stated that the phrase "pursuit of
happiness" occurs three times in John Locke, though not in a political context.
Boyd also cites CNsAaN,
THOMAS JEFFERSON, TnE APosTLE or AmmicANISM
(1939), and Ganter, Jeffersoi's "Pursuit of Happiness" and Some Forgotten
Men, 16 WTILIAm AND MARY QUARTERLY (2d) 442, 558 (1936). See also DUmBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 60 et

seq. (1950).
33
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distance, no more than the Final Cause, or Great Contriver,
or Prime Mover of the universe; and as such was conceived
as exerting his power and revealing his will indirectly through
his creation rather than directly by miraculous manifestation
or through inspired books. In the eighteenth century as never
before, 'Nature' had stepped in between man and God; so
that there was no longer any way to know God's will except
by discovering the 'laws' of Nature, which would doubtless be the laws of 'nature's god' as Jefferson said.

This view of Becker has a considerable element of truth
in it, for the eighteenth century was the stronghold of deism.
But it does not seem accurate to point to John Locke, as
Becker does, as authority for the unqualified proposition
that "men, barely by the use of their natural faculties,
may attain to all the knowledge they have." " For, especially where moral truths are concerned, Locke explicitly
points out the shortcomings of natural reason."
Natural religion, in its full extent, was nowhere that I know
taken care of by the force of natural reason. It should seem,
by the little that has hitherto been done in it, that it is too
hard a task for unassisted reason to establish morality in all
its parts, upon its true foundation, with a clear and convincing light. And it is at least a surer and shorter way to
the apprehensions of the vulgar and mass of mankind, that
one manifestly sent from God, and coming with visible authority from Him, should, as a king and law-maker, tell them
their duties and require their obedience, than leave it to the
long and sometimes intricate deductions of reason to be made
out of them. Such trains of reasoning the greater part of
mankind have neither leisure to weigh, nor, for want of education and use, skill to judge of.... You may as soon hope
to have all the day-labourers and tradesmen, the spinsters
and dairy-maids, perfect mathematicians, as to have them
perfect in ethics this way. Hearing plain commands is the
sure and only course to bring them to obedience and practice. The greater part cannot learn, and therefore they must
halieve.

Fowler continues, with excerpts from Locke: 3"
34
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It is true that reason quickly apprehends and approves
of these truths, when once delivered, but "native and original
truth is not so easily wrought out of the mine as we, who
have it delivered already dug and fashioned into our hands,
are apt to imagine;" moreover, "experience shows that the
knowledge of morality by mere natural light (how agreeable
soever it be to it) makes but slow progress and little advance
in the world."

But by the time of the American revolution the seed sown
by Locke and his followers had ripened. In addition men
had come to have a greater and greater reliance on their
ability through mere natural reason to discover the moral
laws of nature and the will of God. Consequently, there is
considerable truth in the assertion that: 11
In the eighteenth century . . . these truths were widely
accepted as self-evident: that a valid morality would be a
"natural morality," a valid religion would be a "natural religion," a valid law of politics would be a "natural law." This
was only another way of saying that morality, religion, and
politics ought to conform to God's will as revealed in the essential nature of man....
Thus the eighteenth century, having apparently ventured
so far afield, is nevertheless to be found within hailing distance of the thirteenth; for its conception of natural law in
the world of human relations was essentially identical, as
Thomas Aquinas' conception had been, with right reason.

It would be an oversimplification to imagine that the
natural law philosophy of the fathers of the revolution
represented scholasticism pure and undiluted. Historically
it is fair to state that their ideas were a mingling of many
factors and influences. Bryce points out:3 s
37 BECKER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 57, 61.
38 1 BRYcE, THE Awm cAN COMMONWEALTH 29-30 (2d ed. 1911). Compare Bacxxa, op. cit. suprC note 26, at 27. For evidence of scholastic influence

on the Founding Fat-hers, see the following pertinent references. Figgis, On
Some Political Theories of the Early Jesuits, 11 TRANSACTIONS Or. THE ROYAL

HISTORICAL Socmarr (N.S.) 94 (1897):

"From the Society of Jesus the theory

passed to the English Whigs. Locke and Sidney, if they did not take their
political faith bodily from Suarez or Bellarmin, [sic] managed in a -remarkable
degree to conceal thb differences between the two." McI.wAmn, THE PouiTcAL
WoRKs OF JAses I xxvii (1918), in speaking of Bellarmine and his fellow
Jesuits, stated: "At a single glance it becomes obvious how much English
theorists, for two centuries and more owed to a party whom they dared not
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They had for their oracle of political philosophy the treatise
of Montesquieu on the Spirit of Laws, which, published
anonymously at Geneva forty years before, had won its way
to an immense authority on both sides of the ocean.... Of
the supposed influence of other Continental authors, such as
Rousseau, or even of English thinkers such as Burke, there
are few direct traces in the Federal Constitution. . . But
• . . abstract theories regarding human rights had laid firm
hold on the national mind.... The influence of France and
her philosophers belongs chiefly to the years succeeding 1789,
when Jefferson, who was fortunately absent in Paris during
the Constitutional Convention, headed the democratic propaganda.

From English sources they inherited the common law tradition which was primarily Christian and scholastic, although
many of them also were influenced by Locke whose ideas
on happiness we have previously characterized as a variety
of theistic utilitarianism. It cannot be stated apodictically
that the happiness philosophy underlying the Declaration
was derived from this or that source alone. But we shall
indicate some of the doctrines about happiness as the end
of government, and happiness as a criterion of morality
which appear to have played a part in the political formation of the founding fathers.
Happiness as the end of government is an ancient idea,
declares Julian P. Boyd, and it is embraced by James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, George Mason,
James Otis and a great number of the contemporaries of
Jefferson, to "say nothing of Burlamaqui, Wollaston, Beccaria, Bolingbroke, and a friend of Thomas Hobbes, John
Hall. . . . "9

In fact it is commonplace with scholastic

writers, too, that temporal felicity (as they term it, to make
sure it will not be confused with beatitude) is the end of
civil society. For instance, in a typical manual, that of
Nicholas Russo, one finds the doctrine that the end of civil
society is the safety, prosperity and perfection of its citiacknowledge" Hunt, The Virginia Declaration of Rights and Cardinal Bellarmine, 3 CATHOLIC HIsTORicAL REVIEW 276-49 (1917).
39 BOYD, op. cit. supra note 30, at 4.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

zens. The state provides for their safety by making them
secure in life, liberty and property; it provides for their
prosperity by helping them according to their needs and
abilities to provide for themselves a supply of material
goods; it promotes the perfection of its citizens by supplying means through which their bodily health, and mental
and moral faculties may be perfected.4"
The same general conception is found in Emerich de Vattel's Law of Nations, which was a political manual for John
Adams, James Wilson, Thomas Jefferson and many of the
revolutionary statesmen. Vattel teaches: 4 1
The end or aim of civil society is to procure for its citi-

zens the necessities, the comforts, and the pleasures of life,
and, in general, their happiness; to secure to each the peaceful enjoyment of his property and a sure means of obtaining
justice; and finally to defend the whole body against all external violence....
John Adams may have been unconsciously drawing on Vattel, whom he had studied, when he said:4 2
Upon this point all speculative politicians will agree, that
the happiness of society is the end of government, as all divine
and moral philosophers will agree that the happiness of the
individual is the end of man. From this principle it will follow that the form of government which communicates ease,
comfort, security, or, in one word, happiness, to the greatest
number of persons, and in the greatest degree, is the best.
The philosophy of nature and of natural law found its
way into the Colonies in the eighteenth century through
Americans educated abroad, and through the works of
Newton and Locke and their expositors, which were available at Yale, Harvard and Princeton well before the Declaration.4 3 Furthermore the whole common law tradition
40
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VATTFL, LAW OF NATIONS, as quoted in BoYi, op. cit. supra iiote 30, at

5 n.10. Boyd is of the opinion that this philosophy of Vattel, in which human
happiness and good politics are intermingled, stems from Leibnitz' theory of
human perfectibility which was adopted by Christian Frederich von Wolff and
digested and popularized by Vattel
42 As quoted in BoYn, op. cit. supra note 30, at 4.
43 See BEcKER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 74-5.
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of England, which was the basis of colonial institutions,
was a Christian, natural law tradition.
John Hall, a friend of Hobbes, asserted the pursuit of
happiness as a natural right of the individual in 1651 in
his work The Grounds and Reasons of Monarchy Considered, in these terms :
. .. my natural liberty, that is to say, to make my life as

justly happy and advantageous to me as I can, he [the monarch] can no more give away from me than my understanding and eyesight, for these are privileges which God and
nature hath endued me with, and these I cannot be denyed,
but by him that will deny me a being.

The same point of view of the individual's right to pursue
his temporal happiness is implicit in the whole conception
of happiness and morality adopted by Locke, and exemplified by such diverse writers as Blackstone, Wilson, and
Paley.
Blackstone, whose Commentaries had a wide circulation
in America after their first publication in 1765, expounds
the relation between natural law and happiness as follows: 4
As, therefore, the Creator is a Being, not only of infinite
power, and wisdom, but also of infinite goodness, He has been
pleased so to contrive the constitution and frame of humanity that we should want no other prompter to inquire after
and pursue the rule of right, but only our own self-love, that
universal principle of action. For He has so intimately connected, so inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal justice
with the happiness of each individual, that the latter [happiness of the individual] cannot be attained but by observing
the former [laws of eternal justice]; and if the former be
punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In consequence of which mutual connection of justice and human
felicity, He has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and precepts ...

but has graciously

reduced the rule of obedience to this one paternal precept,
"that man shall pursue his own true and substantial happiness." This is the foundation of what we call ethics or
natural law.
44
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Of which excerpt I will only remark at this point that it
seems to make good and evil depend ultimately on the
will of God rather than on His nature, and that it oversimplifies the norm of morality-to say the least.
A similar blending of theology, natural law and happiness as a moral criterion appears to be expressed in the
following statement of James Wilson of Pennsylvania:"
[God] being infinitely and eternally happy in himself,
his goodness alone could move him to create us, and give
us the means of happiness. The same principle, that moved
his creating, moves his governing power. The rule of his
government we shall find to be reduced to this one paternal
command-Let man pursue his own perfection and happiness....
. . what is the efficient cause of moral obligation-of the
eminent distinction between right and wrong? . ..
*

. . . I give it this answer-the will of God. This is the supreme
law.
As a final example of this philosophical tendency which

was current when the founding fathers lived, and which
influenced their views on the pursuit of happiness, let me
quote an interesting application which Paley makes of his
theologico-utilitarian concept of happiness. For though this
was published after the American Revolution, yet it presupposes the same ideas that underlay revolutionary
thought. In fact it is particularly apropos, as being a criticism of the Declaration itself in the light of a philosophy
of happiness taken for granted by Paley with which Jefferson may have agreed. Paley is discussing the grounds of
civil obedience. He rejects any original contract or social
compact and assigns as "the only ground of the subject's
obligation, THE WILL OF GOD AS COLLECTED FROM EXPEDIENCE." He argues as follows: 4
"It is the will of God that the happiness of human life
be promoted: "-this is the first step, and the foundation not
46 WILSON, Of the Law of Nature in' THE WORxS OP JAmEs WsoN
99, 104, 105 (Andrews ed. 1895).
47 1 PALEY, op. cit. supra note 22, 6.3.318.
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only of this, but of every moral conclusion.---"Civil society
conduces to that end:'-this is the second proposition."Civil societies cannot be upholden, unless, in each, the interest of the whole society be binding upon every part and
member of it:"--this is the third step, and conducts us to the
conclusion, namely, "that so long as the interest of the whole
society requires it, that is, so long as the established government cannot be resisted or changed without public inconvenience, [i.e., public happiness] it is the will of God (which
wil universally determines our duty) that the established
government be obeyed,"--and no longer.
This principle being admitted, the justice of every particular case of resistance is reduced to a computation of the
quantity of the danger and grievance on the one side, and of
the probability and expense of redressing it on the other.
But who shall judge this? We answer, "Every man for
himself."

Among the practical rules inferred from the general one
of public expediency, which largely coincides with Locke's
"public happiness," is this one:"
"The interest of the whole society is binding upon every
part of it." No rule, short of this, will provide for the stability of civil government, or for the peace and safety of social
life. Wherefore, as individual members of the state are not
permitted to pursue their emolument to the prejudice of the
community, so is it equally a consequence of this rule that
no particular colony, province, town, or district, can justly
concert measures for their separate interest, which shall appear at the same time to diminish the sum of prosperity [another name for human happiness]. I do not mean that it is
necessary to the justice of a measure that it profit each and
every part of the community ... ; but what I affirm is, that
those counsels can never be reconciled with the obligations
resulting from civil union, which cause the whole happiness
of the society to be impaired for the convenience of a part.
This conclusoin is applicable to the question of right between Great Britain and her revolted colonies. Had I been
an American, I should not have thought it enough to have
had it even demonstrated, that a separation from the parent
state would produce effects beneficial to America; my relation
to that [parent] state imposed on me a farther inquiry, namely, whether the whole happiness of the empire was likely to be
48
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promoted by such a measure; not indeed the happiness of
every part; that was not necessary, nor to be expected;-but
whether what Great Britain would lose by the separation, was
likely to be compensated to the joint stock of happiness, by
the advantages which America would receive from it.

Paley is vague in this passage as to whether in his opinion
the Americans really had justice on their side. The significance of the quotation, however, is to show that for
Paley, with whom Jefferson probably agreed, the general
happiness was the test. He was convinced of that, although
he might differ with others on the question of fact, whether
the American revolt would result in a sufficiently greater
happiness of a sufficiently greater number of people to
justify itself.
The possibility of misuse and abuse of such a doctrine
of happiness did not escape the profound mind of James
Madison, who wrote to Monroe as follows: "
There is no maxim, in my opinion, which is more liable
to be misapplied, and which, therefore, more needs elucidation, than the current one, that the interest of the majority
is the political standard of right and wrong. Taking the word
"interest" as synonymous with "ultimate happiness," in which
sense it is qualified with every necessary moral ingredient,
the proposition is no doubt true. But taking it in the popular
sense, as referring to immediate augmentation of property
and wealth, nothing could be more false. In the latter sense,
it would be the interest of the majority in every community
to despoil and enslave the minority of individuals.

III.
Critique of "Pursuit of Happiness" as a Natural Right
Now that we have had a bird's-eye view of general
theories of happiness, and have investigated, superficially
at least, some of the sources from which the founding
49
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fathers drew their notions on happiness as the end of civil
society, and the right of the individual to pursue his own
happiness, we are in a position to see where this philosophy
fits into the general tradition, and to evaluate from the
viewpoint of scholasticism the meaning of the proposition:
"Man has a natural right to pursue happiness."
We saw that from the time of Descartes on, there was
a definite tendency to divorce philosophy from theology,
and that many subsequent writers, even though religiousminded men, were more interested in analyzing and describing man's felicity in this life than in speculating about
the nature of beatitude. Furthermore, the practical bent
of the English mind betrayed itself in the psychological
approach to the question of man's felicity on earth; a habit
of mind which did not relish the metaphysical reaches of
Aristotelian thought. The theories of happiness current
in Jefferson's day, therefore, were theories of man's happiness in this life. And so we must not imagine that the
happiness of the Declaration is the eudaimonia of Aristotle
or the beatitudo of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. It belongs in a different tradition. The pursuit of happiness in
this life is broad enough to include, doubtless, the pursuit
of eternal happiness, and should include it, but the Declaration is dealing with a philosophy of civil society, which
concerns itself directly with the temporal welfare of the
body politic, and the temporal felicity of its citizens. It is
the function of another order, the Church, to provide directly the means of eternal happiness. The state according
to its scope and constitution confines itself to temporal
concerns.
But since so much of political theory deals with the
general welfare as the end of government the question also
arises whether the happiness of the Declaration means the
general happiness (welfare) of the body politic or the happiness of individual men. It seems to me to be clearly intended as individual happiness in the phrase "pursuit of
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happiness." Just as every man individually is endowed by
his Creator with an inalienable right to qife and libertyhis own life, his own liberty-, so each individual is endowed with the right to pursue his own happiness here on
earth. On the other hand, at the end of the same paragraph there appears the phrase "their safety and happiness." Here it is the general happiness or general welfare
that is intended, because here the Declaration speaks of
the right "to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
safety and happiness." It is the promotion of the general
happiness for which new governments are formed and for
which every government exists.
This theory is in substantial harmony with the scholastic teaching of today. Victor Cathrein S.J., one of the
most widely used of the modern manualists, propounds the
following thesis: 1o
The end of civil society is public prosperity, i.e., the sum
of the conditions requisite so that as far as possible all the
organic members of society will be able directly by themselves
to achieve complete temporal felicity, subordinated to their
last end. And among these conditions, the enjoyment of the
juridical order, as the natural structure of society postulates,
occupies the first place while in the second place is a sufficient
abundance of the goods of soul and body which are necessary to achieve the aforesaid felicity and which cannot be sufficiently attained by private initiative.

Another author, in asserting that the specific proximate

end of civil society is the public good of peace and prosperity, explains that the remoter, but still specific, end of
the state is temporal felicity. "That the remote end of the
state is temporal perfect felicity we assume from common
sense and from the fact that man tending towards such
feqicity and finding it impossible of attainment in domestic
society alone, institutes civil society for the attainment of
50
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this perfect temporal felicity." "' Thus it appears to me
that though there are various formulas for expressing the
idea, scholasticism is in close harmony with the Declaration in its assertion of temporal happiness as the end of
government, and in close harmony with the Preamble to
the Constitution which spells out this same temporal happiness.

But there are one or two points worth mentioning
where the natural law philosophy of some of the authors
we have quoted differs from that of scholasticism.
The first is the idea that the natural law is based on
the will of God, i.e., the free will of God. Apparently Locke,
and after him Paley, made right and wrong, good and evil,
depend solely on the will of God. 2 Certainly from the
quotation from Blackstone given above one can infer that
he considers the ultimate cause of the distinction between
right and wrong to be God's will. James Wilson still more
clearly asserts: ". . . what is the efficient cause of moral
obligation?-I give this answer-the will of God. This is
the supreme law." 15
Here we find confusion, it seems to me, of the two questions, what is the cause of moral obligation, and what
causes the difference between moral good and moral evil.
Scholastic philosophers dispute about the cause of moral
obligation, and many of them do invoke the will of God
as the ultimate reason why one is obliged to choose good
and shun evil,-but the will is not God's free will. This,
however, is not the same question as what makes a good
act good and an evil act evil. The basis of this difference,
Scholastics teach, is the eternal nature of God, not His
will, and especially not His free will. The eternal law of
God, universal and unchangeable, is the expression of His
very nature. Man's participation in that law through nat51
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ural reason is called the natural law. Hence the dictates
of natural law, when properly formulated, are unchangeable, because they are based on the unchangeable nature
of God. It was because of the difficulty of this concept
and its practical application to moral problems that there
were so many disputes amongst the Schoolmen as to what
God could permit by way of dispensation or exception, and
what He could not permit as being entirely contrary to
His nature and to the nature of man. Some of the eighteenth century philosophers who were outside the scholastic
tradition lost sight of this important distinction. Pufendorf, a natural law philosopher much read by the founding
fathers, teaches that the ultimate difference between good
and evil must be traced to the free will of God, but once
God freely decreed good and evil to be thus and thus the
decree was unchangeable.54
The second point of difference between scholasticism and
the theories of the eighteenth century is akin to the first.
The happiness philosophy of Locke and Paley, and presumaqy of Jefferson, Adams and others, was a kind of
theistic utilitarianism: theistic because based on God's
will; utilitarian because temporal happiness was made the
measure and criterion of human morality. As Wilson stated
it: "The rule of his [God's] government we shall find to
be reduced to this one paternal command-Let man pursue
his own perfection and happiness." 55 God's will makes
things good or evil. But His goodness has led Him to
contrive things in such wise that happiness and good coincide-even on earth. Consequently by computing happiness (temporal felicity) according to quantity, or quality,
or extent, or all these combined, one has a measure of goodness or evil. In other words the norm of morality is the
usefulness of human conduct in producing temporal felicity
either of the individual or of the generality.
54
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Scholasticism teaches, of course, that the good and the
ultimate good coincide with beatitude, or eternal happiness. But only in a severely limited sense can we say that
human felicity is the measure of the good life on earth.
Generally speaking, perhaps, the man who observes the
moral law has a better chance of achieving felicity on earth
than the man who flouts that law. But as far as observation unmistakably teaches us, that is not universally so.
There are so many exceptions, that temporal felicity cannot
be the essential criterion in spite of the fact that the sinner
often pays for his sins in this life, and that nature, as it
were, frequently avenges herself on those who rebel against
her injunctions.5"
But this is not the place to refute this type of utilitarianism. It is enough for our purpose merely to point
out that the norm of morality according to the Scholastics
is not temporal felicity or any other utilitarian ideal, but
human nature itself. Thus the true measure and criterion
of a human act is a comparison of it with human nature
as a whole, viewed in its relations to self, to one's neighbor, and to God. Hence right reason, the natural law, may
sometimes demand painful sacrifices which in this life will
have no reward. This realistic point of view recognizes
that the good are often unhappy in this life and the evil
happy, or at least that the good are not as happy as the
evil appear to be.
And so finally we come to the question: Has man a
natural law right to happiness in this life?-or at least has
he a natural right to puisue temporal felicity? And let us
use the term temporal felicity in the same connotation as
56 Compare BuEmR, Sermon XII, Upon the Love of Our Neighbor in
THE WORxS ov JosEPH BuTLER 226 (Gladstone ed. 1896): "As we are not
competent judges, what is upon the whole for the good of the world, there may
be other immediate ends appointed us to pursue, besides that one of doing
good, or producing happiness. .
. For there are certain dispositions of mind,
and certain actions, which are in themselves approved or disapproved by mankind, abstracted from the consideration of their tendency to the -happiness or
misery of the world.... "

?
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Paley-preponderance of pleasure over pain, understanding that both pleasure and pain are of the body, mind and
soul-not that I consider this the only or the best way of
describing temporal happiness. Perhaps it would be more
accurate to say with Janet: "Happiness is not, as Bentham claims, the greatest possible sum of pleasure: it is
the highest possible state of excellence, from whence results
the most excellent pleasure." 11 In other words it would
be philosophically more accurate to describe even temporal happiness in Plato's terms of the well-doing (eupraxia) of man's higher faculties, which has as its natural
concomitant an efflorescence of pleasure. But in speaking
of a preponderance of pleasure over pain we at least call
attention to the relative and incomplete character of
earthly happiness and provide a rough measurement of
what is meant by happiness on earth. Nor does this by
any means exclude the hope of heaven as an element of
that comparative freedom from pain, comparative excellence of functioning, and comparative peace of mind that
deserve to be called happiness here below.
I find it impossible to show that all men have a right to
the actual attainment of this kind of happiness on earth,
for these reasons: First, there is no such absolute right
because there are circumstances in which the observance
of the moral law results in unhappiness for this or that
individual. Yet the individual has no right to achieve his
happiness at the expense of the moral law. Secondly,
neither reason nor revelation promises us an infallible reward of earthly happiness in return for observance of the
natural law; nor is there anything inherent in the nature
of things which prevents me from admitting that life is
inevitably unhappy for many people. In fact the doctrine
of original sin and its consequences prepares us for much
human misery not personally deserved. Thirdly, human
experience shows that many people who without blame on
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their part, and without any injustice on the part of others,
are destined to live unhappy lives. Each one of us can
think of many instances, but the example that comes to
my mind are the thousands upon thousands of mentally ill.
If these sufferers have an absolute right to actual happiness here on earth then someone is doing them a grave
injustice. Is it man? No one can point to the man. Is it
God? Absit. Fourthly, we see so much of the I-have-aright-to-be-happy philosophy and to what it leads amongst
the heroes and heroines of fiction as well as the less heroic
characters of real life, that we cannot help but be skeptical
as to the existence of any such right.
Men are undoubtedly meant by nature to be happy.
They are made for it. And if they observe nature's laws
their chances of achieving comparative happiness even in
this life are good. (But I have heard a very wise man say
that there are no happy lives; there are only happy days.)
Furthermore no one will be deprived of eternal happiness
except by his own fault. But have all men a right from
nature to achieve actual happiness on earth? Neither experience, nor philosophy, nor revelation warrant the assertion of such a right.
But the right to pursue temporal happiness is another
matter. That all men have a right to seek the happiness
of this world, subject to the dictates of the moral law, and
in subordination to their final end, is a proposition so clear
that to establish it is to labor the obvious.
First of all, temporal happiness is a good worth having;
it is a thing of true value. Even the Stoics recognized this,
but sought their human felicity in an attempt to eliminate
sensuous pleasures entirely. Certainly neither scholastic
philosophy nor Christian asceticism will tolerate the idea
that human pleasures whether of body or soul are something evil in themselves, and to be shunned." Even St.
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Augustine, the ascetic and philosopher of the City of God,
enumerates the good things of the earthly city that constitute its blessedness here below. 9 This relation between
humanism and the ascetical ideals of Christianity could be
elaborated at great length.
Secondly, temporal happiness is a good specifically proper to man because the universal instinct of all men is to
seek earthly happiness, to shun pain and sorrow, to achieve
the peace, contentment and the "well-doing" that befit
mankind. Only the most intolerable and irrational pessimism would deny this instinct its scope. Only an insane or
upside down philosophy will hold that such a tendency is
evil. Its existence is compelling proof that man has a right
to seek earthly happiness. For the purposes of illustration
this right can be compared with the inherent right which,
according to the Scholastics, all men have in relation to
property (though in fact it is much more obvious and much
more fundamental than that right). Everyone has a right
to acquire ownership of property. But not everyone has
actual ownership. Furthermore those who have not, have
no right to acquire property by hook and by crook. So too,
everyone has an inherent right to pursue temporal happiness, but those who are without it have no right to attempt
to acquire it at the expense of the rights of others or in
violation of the natural law. Finally, if we examine more
in particular what the conditions of this happiness are, they
will generally resolve themselves into elements and values
which admittedly are objects of natural rights, such as life,
liberty, property, and the rest.
Scholastic philosophy and Catholic teaching therefore,
as stated above,6" recognize:
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the possibility of a relative and incomplete happiness in

this life, and its value; but it insists on the importance of selfrestraint, detachment and control of the particular faculties
and appetites for the attainment of this limited happiness,
and still more, in order to secure that eternal well-being be
not sacrificed for the sake of some transitory enjoyment.

And so the "pursuit of happiness," as it appears in the
Declaration of Independence, has little to do with the
eudaimonia of Aristotae or the beatitudo of scholasticism.
It is concerned with temporal felicity conceived along more
practical lines. Indeed, one of the philosophical currents
which appears to have influenced it is a type of theistic
utilitarianism which scholastic philosophy rejects. Nevertheless, no matter what its sources-and we have seen how
varied and mingled they were-as it stands, it is a statement of natural law right entirely in accord with scholastic
theory. For it does not assert an absolute right which all
men have to the actual achievement of happiness in this
life, but rather records the se1f-evident proposition that
the right to seek happiness here below is part of man's
very nature.
When Augustine was writing The City of God, discoursing tranquilly on the nature of happiness, the northern barbarian invaders were overrunning the civilization of Rome.
Today when our own civilization is threatened, not only
from without by similar oncoming hordes, but from within
by some who share the materialistic philosophy of the aggressor, it may seem unduly academic to discourse upon
the pursuit of happiness. But happiness is not really academic with any of us. It is our daily preoccupation. Let
us thank God, then, that our right to pursue it as human
beings, clothed with the dignity that belongs to every
human, is protected by the fundamental laws and principles and institutions of the beloved land in which we live.
Civilizations live and die by principles. If the principles
of the Declaration of Independence were a mere tinsel of
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glittering generalities, our American civilization would not
have survived to this day. For at the bottom of every
human problem, and at the bottom of every political problem, there always lies a theological problem. Who is God?
What is He like? Who is man? What is his nature? Is
God his destiny?
The founding fathers of this republic had definite answers in their minds to these questions, answers which
though not in entire agreement with Catholic faith and
scholastic tradition, yet were substantially the truths of
the Christian religion and of natural religion. These answers were reflected in their political philosophy. Their
house was not built on sand, because their principles were
true. Those principles recognized man for what he is, a
creature of God, endowed by God with certain natural
rights, and among these, the right to pursue his happiness
here on earth.
Our views on happiness are inevitably shaped by our
views on these fundamental theological issues. If man is
mere matter, his only happiness is the pleasure of this life,
whether higher or lower. If man is only a bundle of reflexes
and reactions, then his happiness is nothing more than that
"adequate adjustment to environment" which is the goal
of psychiatry and mental hygiene. But if man is a creature
of body and spirit, with the supernatural beatific vision
of God as his immortal destiny, then the happiness of this
life must be but a shadow of that which is to come; and
the agonies of the human heart which besiege us on all
sides begin to have some meaning and explanation. Neither
this happiness nor those agonies are academic.
What does the City of God say about them? Augustine
asserts: 61
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that life eternal is the supreme good, death eternal the
supreme evil, and that to obtain the one and escape the other
we must live rightly. And thus it is written, "The just [man]
lives by faith," (Heb. ii. 4) for we do not as yet see our good,
and must therefore live by faith; neither have we in ourselves power to live rights, but can do so only if He who
has given us faith to believe in His help do help us when we
believe and pray.
...

John C. Ford S.J.*

*Professor of Moral Theology, Weston College; Professor of Ethics, Boston
College. A. B., 1927, A. M., 1928, Boston College; S. T. L., 1933, Weston College;
S. T. D., 1937, Gregorian University, Rome; LL.B., 1941, Boston College. Formerly Professor of Jurisprudence and Domestic Relations, 1943, Boston College;
Professor of Moral Theology, 1945-6, Gregorian University, Rome. Member,
Catholic Theological Society of America. Author of books and monographs in
the fields ol Moral Theology, Philosophy, and Legal Philosophy. Contributor,
Fordham Law Review.

